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OF ICEBERGS AND GLACIERS:  
THE SUBMERGED CONSTITUTION OF 
AMERICAN HEALTHCARE 
THEODORE W. RUGER* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States is presently in the midst of a fractious and polyphonic 
debate about the future shape of its healthcare finance and delivery system. 
Spurred in significant part by the controversial passage of a major federal 
health insurance statute two years ago, this debate implicates foundational 
questions of government authority and constitutional limitation that have 
transcended the traditional boundaries of health law. Although in many 
respects it is an incomplete and unfinished reform, the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (ACA)1 manifests a new congressional focus on insurance 
regulation and expanded access and raises significant questions about, and 
opposition to, the increased role of the federal government and the new federal 
and state bureaucracies that the Act creates. 
As with other episodes of transformative legal restructuring in the United 
States and elsewhere, the ACA (or more accurately, the future transformation 
of medical care delivery that it may portend) has provoked vigorous opposition 
in legal and political discourse. And also, as with earlier episodes of 
constitutional transformation, this dissent sounds in multiple registers and 
employs different oppositional vernaculars and diverse institutional levers in an 
effort to thwart the full implementation of the ACA’s regulatory measures. The 
most visible strand of this opposition is the multifaceted litigation against the 
constitutionality of the individual mandate that has proceeded in various 
federal courts around the country and is presently before the U.S. Supreme 
Court. Couched within the familiar decisional forum of the federal courts, the 
litigation offers the prospect of a determinate institutional statement on the 
question of the individual mandate’s constitutionality within a reasonably 
predictable time frame. 
No such institutional centrality or prospect of finality exists in the roiling 
popular opposition to the ACA and related health reforms that are playing out 
in various extrajudicial fora. Clearly the ACA’s wisdom and its constitutionality 
 
Copyright © 2012 by Theodore W. Ruger. 
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 1.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
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will be a major issue in the national popular election of 2012 and most likely 
those of 2014 and 2016 as well. Opposition to the Act has already manifested in 
profligate state legislative and referendum activity: By my count, in the fall of 
2011 there were 197 separate state statutes or referenda pending in the fifty 
states, many bearing evocative titles like Missouri’s “Big Government Get Off 
My Back Act,”2 which purports to exempt small businesses from enforcement of 
various state and federal mandates. This immediate popular opposition is 
important and interesting, and treated in nuanced fashion in several other 
papers in this symposium.3 
My aim in this short article is to place the current constitutional litigation in 
an even broader frame of reference than that of the present day’s popular 
constitutionalism. Taking a much longer temporal view, it is possible to regard 
the current debate over the ACA as but one episode in an ongoing process of 
legal and normative construction and contestation about the proper locus of 
authority in American medicine that stretches back well into the nineteenth 
century. Like the small portion of an iceberg visible above the waters, the 
current ACA litigation is merely the most visible and immediately salient 
manifestation of much more enduring public concerns about institutional 
intrusion on individualistic choice in medical care. 
The embrace of highly diffuse authority over medical decisions has long 
been prioritized by patients and physicians, and will continue to hold a powerful 
sway over public attitudes long after the dust has settled on this episode of 
litigation. Yet the fragmentation and resistance to institutional control—
whether public or private institutions—that has for years characterized the 
healthcare delivery system in the United States is becoming increasingly 
unsustainable and problematic. As imperatives of cost control and quality 
assurance necessarily demand public and private reordering that will be much 
more extensive than the individual mandate in the decades ahead, we can 
regard the current constitutional litigation, however heated within its 
institutional bounds, as a rather mild precursor to the real battle over authority 
in medicine that will unfold over the next few decades. 
In the following pages I will describe the broad historical and legal contours 
of this traditional authority structure in American medicine and relate it to the 
instant litigation; a later section more specifically examines the long 
development of healthcare federalism in the context of today’s Commerce 
Clause challenge. 
 
 2.  MO. ANN. STAT. § 1.310 (West 2011) (providing that “[t]his section shall be known and may be 
cited as the “Big Government Get Off My Back Act”). 
 3.  See, e.g., Bryan Leitch, On the Difficulty of Separating Law and Politics: Federalism and the 
Affordable Care Act, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2012 at 203; Ernest A. Young, Popular 
Constitutionalism and the Underenforcement Problem: The Case of the National Healthcare Law, 75 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2012 at 157.  
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II 
HISTORICAL AND LEGAL CONTOURS IN AMERICAN MEDICINE 
As I have written in more detail elsewhere, two centuries of health law 
development—in all its multiple forms and multiple institutional architects—
have played a crucial role in the construction of a deeply entrenched but 
increasingly unsustainable structure of medical authority. From its early 
appearances in congressional constitutional discourse through the late 
nineteenth century flourishing of common law doctrines and into the twentieth 
century statutory regimes, the hydraulic push of American health law has been, 
until very recently, relentlessly centrifugal, pushing therapeutic authority to the 
individualized discretion of physicians and their patients. In the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, constitutional federalism, licensure statutes, and a 
bevy of particularized common law rules all operated sequentially and 
cumulatively to disable other forms of decisional authority, whether from 
government actors or from private institutions such as hospitals or insurers. The 
multiple legal institutions that operated to create the health law regime of the 
United States fostered, enhanced, and gave specific shape to the diffusion and 
individuation of medical authority. Well through the middle of the twentieth 
century, the state law institutions that controlled health law rules operated to 
enshrine and solidify the authority of individual physicians and to deter 
standardization or institutional centrality in American medicine. And even after 
health law’s strong-form restrictions have receded in recent decades, the 
normative and organizational structure of American healthcare remains. 
This regime of diffuse authority in American medicine was constructed 
primarily of “ordinary” law forms—although it has proven at least as durable 
and entrenched as the stuff of high-status constitutional doctrine—and has 
exerted a powerful trumping effect on public and private reordering that is 
functionally similar to the role played by more recognizable constitutional law. 
The common law doctrines that state courts crafted and applied from the late 
nineteenth century onward in the health law area reflect courts’ eclectic 
borrowing and modification from the fields of tort, contract, fiduciary duty, and 
others, creating what some scholars have called a “chaotic, dysfunctional 
patchwork” of diverse legal forms.4 Despite this patchwork dynamic, it is 
conceptually possible to lump broad swaths of health law’s traditional canon 
into two general functional clusters. In the first basket are first-order specificity 
rules, which articulated and enforced legal doctrines that encouraged and 
protected therapeutic individuation. For instance, the customary standard of 
care in medical malpractice was in actuality a cluster of multiple standards of 
care with courts permitting meaningful therapeutic variation along variables 
such as type of medical training, mode of practice, geographic location, and 
other factors. Doctors in different locations were privileged by thin-sliced 
 
 4.  See M. Gregg Bloche, The Invention of Health Law, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 247, 250 (2003). 
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liability rules (for example, the “locality rule,”5 which was an American 
common law invention never adopted in English law) to practice medicine 
differently from physicians in other towns in the same state. Even to the present 
day, medical liability rules serve to render a certain rough compensatory justice 
in some cases but do little or nothing to promote optimal methods of care 
between various therapeutic alternatives.6 
A second set of legal doctrines framed a century ago by state courts and 
legislatures operated primarily as displacing rules, acting to preserve 
therapeutic individualization indirectly (although no less significantly) by 
blocking or trumping other forms of private institutional ordering that might 
otherwise have exerted a standardizing influence on medical authority. Courts 
framed and employed doctrines such as the prohibition on the “corporate 
practice of medicine” to preserve the traditional diffuse structures of medical 
authority against incursion from new organizational forms of private control, 
particularly the rise of the corporation in the late nineteenth century United 
States and the nonprofit hospital in the twentieth. Such trumping rules were 
actively sought by doctors, and willingly extended by common law courts, with 
the result that the practice of medicine developed and expanded without 
meaningful public or private control through much of the twentieth century. 
The health delivery system’s development through the century was shaped by 
these constraints on institutional ordering. 
Throughout the past century, observers have noted the pernicious policy 
effects of these displacing rules. In 1938, a Yale Law Journal commenter 
presciently declared that the prohibition on institutional control of physicians 
stifled “extensive experimentation with methods of medical organization” and 
thus frustrated “[e]fforts to obtain adequate medical care at reasonable costs.”7 
Mark Hall wrote much more recently that the rule against corporate 
employment of physicians was a “puzzling doctrine . . . clouded with confused 
reasoning and . . . founded on an astounding series of logical fallacies,” and 
comprehensively cataloged the doctrine’s “long history of suppressing needed 
innovation” throughout the twentieth century.8 The core doctrines of American 
health law did not create the original diffusion of authority in nineteenth 
century medicine, but were instrumental in calcifying and extending that 
 
 5.  See Jon R. Waltz, The Rise and Gradual Fall of the Locality Rule in Medical Malpractice 
Litigation, 18 DEPAUL L. REV. 408, 410 (1969) (describing the rule’s origins and noting that “the 
English courts never developed such a principle”). 
 6.  Several recent medical malpractice reform proposals seek to alter this dynamic: For instance, 
by expressly incorporating evidence-based standards as safe harbors against malpractice liability. See, 
e.g., Linda L. LeCraw, Use of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 3 J. 
ONCOL. PRAC. 254 (Sep. 2007).  
 7.  See Note, Right of Corporation to Practice Medicine, 48 YALE L.J. 346, 346–47 (1938). 
 8.  Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to Health Care Cost 
Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 510 (1998) (noting specific episodes of hospital and insurance 
industry innovation at different periods in the twentieth century that were thwarted by judicial 
invocation of the doctrine and lamenting that “courts were entirely unresponsive in tempering” its 
dampening effect on innovation). 
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individuated authority regime throughout the twentieth century. Although most 
of these doctrines have been modified or abandoned by state courts in recent 
decades, they did more than enough work earlier in the century to lock in the 
basic regime of medical authority that persists today. 
Finally, the mid–twentieth century’s most important doctrinal innovation 
relative to physician authority did nothing to alter the general diffusion of 
healthcare decisions even as it worked a sea change in the relative power 
balance between physicians and patients. Legal scholars, ethicists, and common 
law judges coalesced after 1960 to articulate a new emphasis on informed 
patient consent and the cognate principle that medical decisionmaking ought to 
be shared between doctor and patient rather than dictated by the former. This 
produced a crucial shift in health law doctrine, and worked a dramatic legal and 
normative change in the relationships between physicians and patients. Yet the 
real legal changes fostered by the informed consent ideal did nothing to reduce 
the diffuse character of medical decisionmaking in the United States. Medical 
decisions were now binary rather than unitary, but remained devolved to the 
most particularized level of the delivery system, with predictable consequences 
in the morally hazardous context of third-party insurance. 
With this individuated authority structure entrenched and protected by 
various doctrinal levers, important legal and financial developments in the 
middle of the twentieth century acted to accelerate and entrench the 
individuated authority structures of American medicine through greater 
resource inputs channeled into the preexisting regime. Favorable tax laws and 
wartime wage restrictions fueled a vast expansion in the number of Americans 
with employment-based private health insurance between 1940 and 1960, and 
the passage of Medicare in 1965 added millions of seniors to the public 
insurance rolls. These developments channeled tens of billions of dollars into 
the growing health system, yet these resources were injected into the preexisting 
structure of diffuse therapeutic individualism, with institutional effort from 
public or private payors to control physician discretion until the twentieth 
century’s end. 
Importantly for current and future debates and efforts at restructuring, this 
individuated conception of medical authority in the United States has proven 
significantly more durable than the original constitutional understandings and 
common law rules that helped create it in the first place. Since the middle of the 
twentieth century, the formal constitutional barriers to federal involvement in 
the healthcare enterprise have largely evaporated, and likewise state courts 
have diluted or abandoned many of the common law doctrines that protected 
physician autonomy from institutional control. Yet even as the formal legal 
structures that created and enforced our fragmented medical decisionmaking 
regime have fallen away, support for this foundational authority structure 
remains deep, exerting important constraints on public and private attempts to 
reorder the healthcare delivery system. In this sense the health law system in 
the United States is glacial in at least two ways: first in its remarkably slow pace 
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of change, reform, and systematic federal involvement relative to other 
economic areas, but also in the sedimentary or residual dynamic described here. 
Even as problematic formal rules in the health law area receded, the 
fragmented and diffuse organization of American healthcare remains as a 
sedimentary legacy of this prior legal regime very much relevant in institutional 
form and public and physician attitudes. 
The structure of the Medicare program, particularly as designed and 
implemented originally in the 1960s, is a prime example of this dynamic of 
powerfully rooted old authority structures shaping (or warping) newer federal 
interventions. Medicare was, and is, a massive federal budgetary commitment to 
health security that was, in its earliest decades, a blank check subsidizing 
traditional physician and patient behavior. Even today it only weakly serves to 
monitor physician activity, with consequent substantial variation in treatment 
and utilization costs. 
The unsustainable nature of this authority model is evident: The 
simultaneous embrace of a health security ideal for seniors and traditional 
therapeutic individualism in the Medicare context has been rendered workable 
only by pouring more and more money into the system. In 1960, just before the 
passage of Medicare and Medicaid, total health spending in the United States 
accounted for only 5.2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).9 Since then, it has 
more than tripled as a percentage of GDP, at about 17% by recent estimates. 
This cost growth is not due solely, or primarily, to government largesse—private 
health insurance cost growth in the past decade has been greater than that of 
the major public insurance programs. But neither public nor private payors 
have succeeded in containing cost growth. The Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO) forecasts that, if present trends continue, overall healthcare spending 
will account for 25% of GDP by 2025, 37% by 2050, and 49% by 2082.10 
This trend is clearly unsustainable going forward and has catalyzed a 
growing scholarly consensus that the individuated diffusion of therapeutic 
authority in American medicine and medical law is problematic from the 
perspective of both patient outcomes and systemic cost. Medical errors remain 
commonplace in the United States, and many studies suggest that implementing 
evidence-driven standards of care and systems-based approaches would reduce 
error rates and improve outcomes.11 Moreover, the variations in individual 
treatment protocols produced by the devolution of medical decisionmaking to 
the bedside have been major drivers of cost increases, particularly when 
coupled with the moral hazard of third-party insurance, which allows individual 
patients and their doctors to shift the costs of their particularized decisions to 
 
 9.  See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 3085, THE LONG-TERM OUTLOOK FOR HEALTH 
CARE SPENDING (2007), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/87xx/doc8758/11-13-LT-Health.pdf. 
 10.  See id. 
 11.  See, e.g., Elliott S. Fischer et al., The Implications of Regional Variations in Medicare Spending, 
Part 2: Health Outcomes and Satisfaction with Care, 138 ANN. INT. MED. 288, 297–98 (2003).  
RUGER (DO NOT DELETE) 4/3/2012 11:41 AM 
No. 3 2012] OF ICEBERGS AND GLACIERS 221 
public or private risk pools.12 Yet efforts to promulgate guidelines or otherwise 
standardize care, whether driven by public or private institutional actors, are 
often met by fierce public and physician resistance borne out of deep normative 
entrenchment of this older constitution of therapeutic individualism. 
For all of this imperative for systemic change, the ACA is influenced by the 
hydraulic push of health law’s traditional constitution just as its predecessor 
federal statutes were. The ACA’s architecture is clearly and profoundly 
solicitous of the extant structures of the medical delivery system. Despite its 
infamous length and its allegedly transformative nature, the ACA is—at 
bottom—a gap-filling statute aimed at closing significant loopholes in the 
complex existing architecture of public and private health insurance in the 
United States, and it does little to simplify or make more coherent the 
fragmented healthcare delivery system that already exists. The Act cures two 
major shortfalls in current access to health insurance: By expanding Medicaid 
dramatically to cover tens of millions more people at or near the poverty line, 
and also through its insurance exchange provisions that will help many 
Americans with preexisting conditions gain access to health insurance. But in 
the immediate term it does little to rework the basic structure of the medical 
delivery system, which is replete with high levels of individual variation in 
physician practice and dramatic annual cost increases. The ACA does evince an 
awareness that business as usual in the operation of the nation’s major public 
and private insurance programs is unsustainable and creates some new 
institutions that might improve upon system performance (for instance, the 
controversial Independent Payment Advisory Board13 to propose Medicare cost 
reductions), but these reforms are incomplete and nascent at this time. 
Viewed in this broader context, it is possible, with a few points of emphasis, 
to regard the current ACA litigation in a different light. First, the attacks on the 
individual mandate within and outside of the courts, particularly in that they are 
grounded in opposition to a perceived intrusion on individual choice, are 
conceptually derivative of this deeply entrenched set of norms that is contained 
in the traditional constitution of American health law. Polls show that the 
individual mandate provision is by far the most unpopular insurance regulation 
provision in the ACA. The public favors, by a wide margin, many of the 
underwriting restrictions in the Act, particularly the ban on preexisting 
conditions exclusions, but is much less keen on the mandate itself.14 A more 
 
 12.  High-profile examples of this feature of healthcare delivery abound. A set of studies by both 
the Dartmouth Atlas of American Health Care and the Congressional Budget Office have found 
dramatic variations in Medicare cost per patient in different regions of the country, even after 
controlling for all relevant health, population, and price index variables. See, e.g., id. 
 13.  See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3403.  
 14.  Mollyann Brodie et al., Liking The Pieces, Not The Package: Contradictions In Public Opinion 
During Health Reform, 29 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1125, 1127 (2010); Louise Radnofsky, Poll: Voters Like 
Much of Health Care Law—But Not Individual Mandate, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 30, 2011, 7:00 AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2011/11/30/poll-voters-like-much-of-health-care-law-but-not-the-
individual-mandate/. 
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nuanced framing study demonstrates that the perceived intrusion on individual 
autonomy in healthcare decisions in particular makes the mandate unpopular: 
Polling questions that reference “choice” when asking about the mandate 
produce the highest levels of public opposition.15 
These studies illuminate one conceptual incongruity between the 
imperatives of formal constitutional doctrine and the realities of public 
opposition. The case for the mandate’s Commerce Clause invalidity hinges on 
its characterization as a regulation of pure inactivity. Yet the public opposition 
to the mandate derives from concerns about government intrusion into the 
more active choices that individuals have traditionally made about their medical 
care. There is an irony as well for supporters and proponents of the Act, in that 
the mandate provision is most unpopular precisely when framed as a mandatory 
incursion on choice. Had the ACA’s architects given the provisions the 
functionally more accurate label of a tax (on a kind of free riding) or an 
“EMTALA risk adjustment payment,”16 presumably they would have faced an 
immediate political hit in late 2009 and 2010 for raising a new tax, but might be 
facing less ongoing opposition over this provision after the Act’s passage. 
Second, given the deep public unease about systemic reordering that 
threatens individual choice, the present opposition to the individual mandate is 
best seen as an early salvo in what promises to be a recurring series of conflicts 
over the reshaping of the American health insurance and delivery systems, 
whatever shape eventual reform takes. There is no public–private distinction in 
this contest of authority regarding the submerged constitution of traditional 
healthcare authority—both private and public efforts to manage, standardize, 
and optimize the allocation of medical care will create conflict with the older 
diffuse model of authority. 
This latter point—about the constraining effect of the public’s embrace of 
the individualized authority regime over even private reform efforts—was 
illustrated by the collapse of managed care in the last decade. In the years 
following the demise of the Clinton plan in 1994, many health policy scholars 
and industry analysts put great faith in the growth of “managed care” delivery 
systems, which sought to centralize care management through prospective 
utilization review, payment reform, and, in some cases, direct employment of 
physicians. Due to ERISA preemption17 of state insurance regulations and other 
permissive factors in the legal and economic landscape of the 1990s, managed 
 
 15.  See David Asch et al., Polling Analysis: Public Support for Health Reform Was Broader Than 
Reported and Depended on How Proposals Were Framed, 30 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1242, 1245 (2011). 
 16.  Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006); see generally 
Neil S. Siegel, Free Riding on Benevolence: Collective Action Federalism and The Minimum Coverage 
Provision, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2012 at 29. 
 17.  Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). On 
ERISA preemption in the context of a leading Supreme Court case, see Theodore W. Ruger, The 
Supreme Court Federalizes Managed Care Liability, 32 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 528 (2004) (describing the 
Aetna v. Davila case which preempted state tort remedies for insurance company negligence in health 
plan administration). 
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care organizations appeared poised to reshape the delivery of healthcare in the 
United States and achieve meaningful cost control in the process. According to 
one leading scholar of this episode, the managed care wisdom of the decade was 
the same one that “imbued President Clinton’s Health Security Act and 
continued to influence public and private decision-making for several years 
thereafter” and was driven by a belief that on insurance and delivery matters 
“one size fit all or could be made to fit all.”18 Many insurance companies, most 
notably Aetna, made huge investment-backed strategic decisions to position 
themselves for the new era of managed care. 
Yet despite no regulation or restriction from the federal government, and 
only weak and incomplete legal responses from the states, the strong-form 
managed care practiced by large insurers in the 1990s proved a disaster for the 
companies themselves, largely due to intense patient and physician opposition. 
Patient enrollees left managed care organizations in droves in many states, 
balking at the notion of more centralized decisionmaking (even as studies 
showed that actual patient satisfaction in such arrangements was as high, or 
higher, than in ordinary fee-for-service insurance). Providers resisted 
vehemently and predictably to threatened incursions on their individuated 
autonomy and refused to negotiate the concessions insurance companies 
expected they could extract. Aetna, the insurance company that had bet most 
heavily on managed care, was hit the hardest, seeing its stock price fall from a 
high of $82 per share in 1997 to $25 in 2001 as it became apparent that the 
heavily managed care model would not work in the institutional and normative 
context of the 1990s.19 Today’s reform imperatives, encouraged in part by some 
of the ACA’s provisions supporting “Accountable Care Organizations,”20 augur 
a return to private ordering in favor of greater institutional control of care, and 
thus similar opposition can be expected to recur repeatedly. 
To the extent it likewise concerns misgivings about centralized intrusions on 
individual choice in the healthcare area, the individual mandate litigation thus 
both echoes prior disputes over medical authority and presages the coming 
battles that will take much longer to resolve. Packaged as it is in the specialized 
vernacular of formal doctrine, and sited in the hierarchical setting of the federal 
courts, the mandate litigation presents a much simpler prospect of resolution. It 
is far more difficult to imagine the manner in which reformed public and private 
healthcare institutions will—across many years and thousands of points of 
institutional conflict—succeed in reordering and rationalizing the longstanding 
patterns of fragmented authority in the medical system. 
Finally, that the individual mandate litigation is a minor skirmish in a much 
broader process of reframing authority in American medicine does not render it 
 
 18.  James C. Robinson, From Managed Care to Consumer Health Insurance: The Fall and Rise of 
Aetna, 23 HEALTH AFFAIRS 43, 44 (2004). 
 19.  Id. at 53. 
 20.  See generally Health Policy Brief, Accountable Care Organizations, HEALTH AFFAIRS (July 
27, 2010). 
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unimportant. To the contrary, precisely because there is so much work to be 
done—work that is much harder than anything framed so far under the ACA—
it is important to put the current controversy behind us and move to more 
difficult and relevant questions of implementing the ACA and other necessary 
public and private sector reforms. A Supreme Court ruling against the 
mandate’s constitutionality would not long obviate the increasing public and 
private institutional control that many of the ACA’s opponents fear, for the 
resource imperative of systemic reform cannot long be held at bay. But a ruling 
against the mandate might produce another cycle of delay in beginning the 
process of reform that is already well overdue. 
III 
THE ACA AND THE LONG PATH OF HEALTHCARE FEDERALISM 
The above pages have given a general overview of the manner in which 
current litigation and public opposition to the ACA interacts with, and relates 
to, broader patterns of individualized authority contained within the submerged 
constitution of American healthcare. Given the current litigation’s core 
doctrinal emphasis on federalism limitations, it is also useful to consider the 
current litigation in the broader frame of the long history of healthcare 
federalism in the United States. Viewed from the perspective of the earliest 
institutional behavior, the doctrinal opposition to the ACA paints an 
anomalous picture of Congress as an overreaching institution in the healthcare 
context: In reality the long pattern of congressional behavior has been to 
exercise considerably less than the full extent of its formal commerce power 
when regulating on matters of health. 
Likewise, when viewed from the perspective of the past half century’s 
explosion of cooperative or joint federalism—where key federally funded 
programs are primarily administered by the states (for example, Medicaid)—the 
ACA litigation’s suggestion of an oppositional or mutually exclusive federalism 
is misleading. The ACA’s architecture adopts and extends the cooperative 
federalism model, leaving substantial discretion for the states in implementing 
the Act’s requirements. There is a substantial and ongoing federalism debate to 
be had over the ACA, but it is different from, and institutionally and temporally 
much broader than, the formalist debates over the Commerce Clause taking 
place in the federal courts today. As the state health insurance exchange 
provisions of the ACA are implemented beginning in 2014, the more important 
federalism questions will be prioritized, as states will exercise broad discretion 
and variation in regulating insurers within and outside of their exchange, with 
real consequences for patients’ rights and optimal system design. Federal 
administrative practice has encouraged such state experimentation in the 
context of predecessor cooperative programs like Medicaid and the State 
Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), and the current administration 
appears to have adopted this posture for the ACA’s implementation. The 
federal department of Health and Human Services (HHS) issued regulations in 
RUGER (DO NOT DELETE) 4/3/2012 11:41 AM 
No. 3 2012] OF ICEBERGS AND GLACIERS 225 
July 2011 that signaled a willingness to give states high levels of discretion to 
variously interpret and implement the ACA’s provisions on exchanges.21 
Experience with Medicaid suggests HHS will continue to permit dramatic state 
variability, and the shape and scope of this devolution in implementation will 
generate recurring questions about uniform standards and state prerogatives to 
administer different insurance regulation regimes. These federalism disputes 
will be ongoing and will reside not in the federal courts but primarily in the 
nuanced context of state and federal administrative practice and congressional 
oversight of the Act’s implementation. 
A more detailed glimpse of the historical development of healthcare 
federalism in the United States illustrates several of these themes. The earliest 
contests of different visions of national authority, which played out first in 
explicit congressional debate described below, are interesting as a comparative 
exercise of heated debate over the same topics subject to current litigation. But 
throughout the nineteenth century, the institutional valence was reversed from 
the premise of current ACA opponents—in that epoch it was Congress that was 
reluctant to exercise even a minimal amount of regulatory authority in the 
health area. Other coordinate branches (various Presidents and the Supreme 
Court) consistently articulated a broader view of the national authority over 
health matters, like the power to quarantine, than Congress was willing to 
operationalize through statutory lawmaking. This pattern of congressional 
declension carried through much of the twentieth century. Put in the language 
of constitutional theory, Congress dramatically overenforced perceived 
federalism limitations (relative to contemporaneous understandings by other 
branches) regarding its power to regulate health matters for almost two 
centuries. 
This pattern of congressional overenforcement (and underactivity) has two 
implications for the Commerce Clause litigation now pending before the 
Supreme Court. First, it would be ironic, and not a little unfortunate, if the 
modern Supreme Court chooses to thwart Congress when it has finally 
exercised regulatory authority in the health field similar to what it has exerted 
in other areas of economic life. The long legislative failure to exercise the full 
scope of congressional authority over health matters should not now be 
interpreted to work a diminution of power in Congress. To the extent 
objections to the ACA are founded in the long tradition of vesting health 
matters to the states, this tradition ought to be recognized for what it is—a 
deferential congressional choice to underregulate rather than a fixed and 
judicially enforceable outer boundary. Relatedly, slipperly slope arguments 
against the ACA’s validity that are premised on a parade of hypothetical 
follow-on laws from Congress (like the famous imaginary broccoli mandate) are 
grounded in a presumption of Congressional profligacy regarding health 
regulation that is directly contrary to the history of two centuries of institutional 
 
 21.  See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Establishment of Exchanges and Qualified 
Health Plans, 76 Fed. Reg. 41866 (proposed July 15, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 155 and 156). 
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reticence in this area. 
Second, it is important to note that the ACA, although an important new 
assertion of federal regulatory authority and federal budgetary commitment, 
nonetheless architecturally reflects the sensitivity to state authority that has 
long been evinced by prior Congresses. States retain primary regulatory 
authority over healthcare financing and delivery under the ACA.22 The statute’s 
form, and its likely impact once implemented, extends and supports state 
regulatory authority over healthcare rather than subverting it. 
The first great debate over the national government’s role in public health, 
which would recur throughout the nineteenth century, was over federal 
quarantine authority. In this institutional dynamic a reluctant Congress 
repeatedly declined to exercise the authority that several Presidents, and even 
the Supreme Court, opined that it held. John Adams was the first American 
President to implore Congress to enact a national health statute,23 although he 
would hardly be the last. He did so in his second annual address to Congress, in 
1798.24 Although the subject was finite (quarantine legislation for ports of entry 
to the United States), the federal government’s authority to act was hotly 
debated, and Adams came down squarely in favor of national power.25 He 
began his major address to Congress not with the growing hostilities with 
France (he would turn to that later) but with an ardent description of the 
“alarming and destructive pestilence with which several of our cities and towns 
have been visited.”26 He noted the “magnitude of the evils arising from the 
interruption of public and private business, whereby the national interests are 
deeply affected,” and described his “duty to invite the Legislature of the 
Union” to consider federal legislation on quarantines. Adams was aware of the 
constitutional doubts surrounding his proposal, and offered his assurances of 
the validity of such federal legislation. Since “contagious sickness may be 
communicated through the channels of commerce,” said the President, it was 
necessary and appropriate that Congress “should frame a system which, while it 
may tend to preserve the general health, may be compatible with the interests 
 
 22.  On the states’ substantial ongoing role in implementing the ACA, see Abbe R. Gluck, 
Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in Health 
Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L. J. 534, 576–95 (2011). 
 23.  Of tangential interest perhaps in the current litigation is the fact that the very first federal 
statute relating to healthcare was itself a mandate to purchase healthcare, applied to ship owners who 
were required to provide medicine and insure merchant seamen against the costs of treatment. All 
ships were required to “provide[ ] a chest of medicines, put up by some apothecary of known 
reputation, and accompanied by directions for administering the same.” See An Act for the 
Government and Regulation of Seamen in the Merchants Service, ch. 24, § 8, 1 Stat. 131, 134 (1790). 
Masters of ships were also required to “provide[ ] . . . for all such advice, medicine, or attendance of 
physicians, as any of the crew shall stand in need of case of sickness . . . without deduction from the 
wages of such sick seaman or mariner.” Id. at 135.  
 24.  John Adams, Second Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 8, 1798), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29440#axzz1k3T2LYIT (last visited Mar. 17, 2012). 
 25.  Id.  
 26.  Id.  
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of commerce and the safety of the revenue.”27 
In proposing such a national quarantine law for seaports, and vouching for 
its constitutional validity, Adams endorsed a view of federal authority over such 
matters that was entirely respectable and widely shared at the time. Key 
members of Congress had recently supported the constitutionality of a similar 
quarantine authority to be vested in the President in the context of a bill 
debated on the floor of the House of Representatives two years earlier. William 
Smith of South Carolina described such power as “perfectly within the Federal 
jurisdiction,” since “if the performance of quarantine was neglected such 
neglect naturally tended to affect the lives as well as the revenue and the 
commerce of the citizens throughout the United States.”28 Samuel Smith of 
Maryland concurred, arguing that this bill was “a commercial regulation, and, 
therefore, the business of the General Government.”29 Reflecting the mutually 
exclusive attitude toward federal–state authority held by many in the early 
nineteenth century, Samuel Sitgreaves of Pennsylvania was even more assertive, 
arguing that it was a “matter of very serious doubt whether, upon this subject 
[of maritime quarantines], the States had any authority at all” since the power 
was “vested by the Constitution in the Congress, under their general authority 
to regulate commerce and navigation.”30 
Even Thomas Jefferson, Adams’ successor in office and no friend of 
expansive national power, would similarly endorse the latent authority of the 
federal government over quarantine in a speech to Congress a few years later. 
In his annual address to that body in 1805, Jefferson acknowledged the 
possibility that federal quarantine legislation might one day prove desirable, 
and defended its constitutional validity (although he declined to propose 
specific action). He proposed a cautious cooperative approach: 
As we advance in our knowledge of this disease, as facts develop the source from 
which individuals receive it, the State authorities charged with the care of the public 
health, and Congress with that of the general commerce, will become able to regulate 
with effect their respective functions in these departments. . . . Although the health 
laws of the States should be found to need no present revisal by Congress, yet 
commerce claims that their attention be ever awake to them.
31
 
Despite such unlikely consanguinity between Adams and Jefferson as to the 
federal commerce power over quarantine laws, these two were merely the first 
in a long line of Presidents to witness Congress acting on a different, and 
sharply diminished, view of national authority in the health law field. In a series 
of legislative decisions that reverberated into the twentieth century, Congress, 
from the late eighteenth century forward, repeatedly declined invitations to 
regulate even minimally in the health field such as by enacting commercial 
 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  5 ANNALS OF CONG. 1357 (1796). 
 29.  Id. at 1352. 
 30.  Id. at 1350.  
 31.  Thomas Jefferson, Fifth Annual Address to Congress (Dec. 3 1805), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29447#axzz1kyw3cmML (last visited Mar. 17, 2012). 
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quarantine laws. Such early legislative incapacity produced a pattern of 
unexercised authority and a corresponding dearth of institutional development 
at the federal level. 
In 1796, the Fourth Congress was the first one to debate the topic 
extensively when it considered a bill similar to the one Adams proposed two 
years later that would have given the President limited maritime quarantine 
authority over incoming ships and their cargo and passengers. In response to 
the claims of constitutional validity summarized above, opponents argued 
vehemently that quarantine laws were “by no means a commercial regulation, 
but a regulation which respected the health of our fellow-citizens” and thus 
within the sphere of state authority.32 Other members raised policy arguments 
favoring individualized state authority, claiming that states “were the best 
judges” of their own situation, and that federal rules would “interfer[e] with 
state policy.”33 
Exasperated at such claims and other statements that a federal quarantine 
would be “imperious” and an “injudicious interference” with the states, William 
Smith, a supporter of federal quarantine authority, questioned his colleagues’ 
denigration of national authority in terms that presaged today’s debates over 
national power and perhaps would resonate with various defenders of the ACA 
against current Commerce Clause challenges. “Who are we?” Smith asked, 
speaking of Congress, “Are we a foreign government?” He also chided 
opponents who had on other topics supported robust federal authority for 
having “already forgotten their arguments on former occasions, when speaking 
of the power of the House, they could then do anything and everything.”34 
Ultimately such arguments in favor of federal legislative action failed in 
1796, as they would after John Adams’s speech in 1798 and then repeatedly 
over the following century. Congress refused to enact national quarantine 
legislation in 1796. Instead, they passed what would be the template for federal 
activity with respect to quarantines through most of the nineteenth century. 
Federal authority was made subservient to the states: The President was 
ordered to “direct the [federal] revenue officers and the [federal] officers 
commanding forts and revenue cutters, to aid in the execution of quarantine” in 
accordance with state law.35 Statutes embodying this deferential reverse-Printz36 
dynamic were reenacted with minor variations several times in the following 
decades.37 So, for instance, Congress in 1798 and 1830 reenacted the same 
 
 32.  5 ANNALS OF CONG. 1352 (1796). 
 33.  Id. at 1354; see also id. at 1351 (statement of Rep. Giles) (noting that Savannah, Georgia was 
one thousand miles from the national capitol and that too much time would elapse before the 
Presidential quarantine order would reach that port to effectively limit disease). 
 34.  See id. at 1356. 
 35.  An Act Relative to Quarantine, ch. 31, 1 Stat. 474 (1796). 
 36.  See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (involving a federal law that temporarily 
sought to implement the opposite dynamic, whereby state officials would participate in implementing a 
federal background check rule for firearms purchases). 
 37.  See Joint Resolution Respecting Quarantine and Health Laws, ch. 42, 14 Stat. 357 (1866); An 
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statute it had in 1796. Congress did establish a tentative national program to 
produce and distribute effective cowpox vaccine in 1813, and appointed federal 
vaccine agents to effectuate the plan.38 But nine years later the national 
legislators opted to discontinue the program, deciding to leave the issue of 
vaccine production and dissemination to the states.39 As late as 1879, Congress 
was still legislating tentatively and inconsistently in the health area: In that year 
it belatedly established a National Board of Health with authority to investigate 
diseases and impose quarantines, but permitted the new agency to lapse four 
years later based on arguments that such authority ought to remain with the 
states.40 Not until the very last decades of the nineteenth century, and after 
express prodding from the Supreme Court, would Congress exercise substantive 
and permanent federal authority over quarantines.41 
By now the pattern is clear enough: From the late eighteenth century 
onward, Congress evidenced a consistent trend of legislating on healthcare 
topics with less than what others within and outside of government thought its 
full Commerce Clause authority would permit. In so doing, Congress appears to 
have been acting on a perception of its own power in this area that was more 
cramped than that shared by other branches. The pages above detail various 
episodes of Presidential endorsement of a federal power over public health in 
the form of quarantine laws. The Supreme Court would have its say on the 
matter in 1886 in an extraordinary bit of dicta. If any doubts remained by then 
about whether Congress’s doctrinal Commerce Clause power was capacious 
enough to accommodate greater federal health legislation, they were put to rest 
in a case involving a railroad’s challenge to a state quarantine statute. Although 
it upheld Louisiana’s power to quarantine, the Court, in an extraordinarily 
directive bit of dicta, was clear about the latent power that rested with Congress 
in that area: 
But it may be conceded that whenever congress shall undertake to provide for the 
commercial cities of the United States a general system of quarantine . . . all state laws 
on the subject will be abrogated, at least so far as the two are inconsistent; but until 
this is done, the laws of the State on the subject are valid. 
. . . . 
For the period of nearly a century since the government was organized congress has 
passed no quarantine law, nor any other law to protect the inhabitants of the United 
States against the invasion of contagious and infectious disease from abroad; and yet, 
 
Act to Enforce Quarantine Regulations, ch. 204, 4 Stat. 577 (1832); An Act Respecting Quarantines 
and Health Laws, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 619 (1799). 
 38.  See An Act to Encourage Vaccination, ch. 37, 2 Stat. 806 (1813); see generally Carleton B. 
Chapman & John M. Talmadge, Historical and Political Background of Federal Health Legislation, 35 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 334 (Spring 1970). 
 39.  See An Act to Repeal the Act, Entitled “An Act to Encourage Vaccination,” ch. 50, 3 Stat. 677 
(1822).  
 40.  See An Act to Prevent the Introduction of Infections or Contagious Diseases Into the United 
States, and to Establish a National Board of Health, ch. 202, 20 Stat. 484 (1879). 
 41.  See generally Michael Les Benedict, Contagion and the Constitution: Quarantine Agitation 
from 1859 to 1866, J. HIST. MED., Apr. 1970, at 177, 177. 
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during the early part of the present century, for many years, the cities of the Atlantic 
Coast, from Boston and New York to Charleston, were devastated by Yellow Fever. 
In later times the cholera has made similar invasions; and the yellow fever has been 
unchecked in its fearful course in the southern cities . . . . During all this time the 
congress never attempted to exercise this or any other powers to protect the people 
from the ravages of these dreadful diseases. No doubt they believe that the power to 
do this belonged to the states.
42
 
Congress during this era seemed less keen than the Court in asserting its 
authority—in 1879 it did finally create a National Board of Health with 
supervisory quarantine authority, but allowed that statute to lapse without 
renewal four years later.43 
The Morgan opinion’s explicit judicial dictum is merely a high profile coda 
to an institutional pattern that recurred throughout the nineteenth century, 
from President Adams’s speech onward. First, Congress repeatedly exercised 
less federal authority in the field of health regulation than coequal branches 
thought it held and ought to exercise. Second, congressional reluctance was 
motivated in significant part by constitutional arguments articulated by its 
members about the scope of their body’s power. Finally, this pattern of inaction 
reverberated through the end of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth 
by virtue of settled patterns of institutional allocation and institutional 
competency that persisted long after the constitutional doubts over federal 
power subsided. That it did so with respect to health matters suggests a 
particular congressional solicitude for the regulatory prerogatives of states in 
that field, even compared with other regulatory areas with similar effects on 
interstate commerce. Well after anyone could seriously claim a Commerce 
Clause disability precluded federal action over healthcare issues, the basic 
structures of federal and state allocation had ossified, with a corresponding 
poverty of federal institutions relating to health regulation. This original 
principle of allocation adopted by Congress still echoes today in the shape of 
major federal statutes as well as the institutional structures that govern 
healthcare in the United States. 
The distance between limited potential federal regulation in the nineteenth 
century was extended and compounded by additional regulatory devolutions 
that took place at the state level. Under the state licensure laws that were 
established by the end of the nineteenth century, the standard model was for 
states to devolve gatekeeping authority to the profession itself in the form of 
state-sanctioned medical boards.44 Authority over medical practice was thus 
 
 42.  See, e.g., Morgan’s La. & Tex. R.R. Co. v. La. Bd. of Health, 118 U.S. 455 (1886). Modern 
observers of institutional interaction between the Court and Congress over the scope of federal 
authority will recognize this episode of judicial advice giving as a curious inversion of the institutional 
posture of the late twentieth century. Whereas the Rehnquist Court, in famously schoolmarmish tones, 
frequently scolded Congress for what the Court saw as Commerce Clause overreaching, the Justices a 
century before impatiently waited for Congress to act where the Court saw no doctrinal barrier. 
 43.  See Carleton B. Chapman & John M. Talmadge, Historical and Political Background of 
Federal Health Care Legislation, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 334, 337–38 (1970). 
 44.  On the rise and operation of state licensure boards in the nineteenth century, see generally 
RICHARD H. SHRYOCK, MEDICAL LICENSING IN AMERICA, 1650–1965 3–43 (The Johns Hopkins 
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doubly diffused from the general government to the states45 and then again to a 
collective board of practitioners. Beyond a generalized gatekeeping authority, 
these boards, well into the twentieth century, exerted almost no actual control 
over the particularities of medical practice, effectively producing yet another 
diffusion from these collective professional structures down to the individual 
bedside. 
This fragmentation of authority that derived from the nineteenth century 
Congress’s crabbed sense of its own Commerce authority mattered in two 
different, related ways that remain relevant today. First, because health 
regulation was vested entirely in the states, the national government of the 
United States was largely absent from the field of public health and health 
policy until the twentieth century. This federal passivity suppressed national 
institutional development of federal bodies that might have played a more 
enhanced role in the twentieth century, and it relatedly shaped the contours of 
major twentieth century health statutes that perversely disabled the federal 
government from exercising its constitutionally permissible authority over the 
practice of medicine. 
On the institutional front, in other nations—even where authority over 
therapeutic treatment was delegated to the professions—a host of ancillary 
health policy and public health functions, such as sanitation, vaccination, and 
quarantine, fell to the national government and led to the development of 
national institutions that would, in the twentieth century, take a more active 
role in regulating the practice of medicine. For instance, nineteenth century 
Britain permitted the medical profession a substantial degree of self-regulation 
like the United States, but in Britain this pattern of diffusion was anchored by 
various national bodies established by Parliament that exerted certain forms of 
centralizing control. In 1836 Parliament created the Office of Registrar General 
in Great Britain, which was vested with the power to collect health statistics 
from local authorities, and in 1848 instituted a General Board of Health.46 The 
British Medical Act of 1858 created a General Council of Medical Education 
and required all practitioners in the nation to register with the council.47 
Although the actual controls over practice exercised by these early boards were 
slight, they reflect an emerging institutional presence at the national level that 
was lacking in the contemporaneous United States.48 
By centering medical regulation in the states, the parsimonious 
 
Press 1967).  
 45.  To say that the federal government has “devolved” authority to the states in this area is a 
modern functionalist view; it is of course more accurate historically to say that the states possessed, and 
retain, primary jurisdiction over such regulation under their inherent police powers. As discussed 
below, however, the federal government has assiduously refrained from entering this field of regulation 
even in the past half century when no formal constitutional barrier exists. 
 46.  JERRY L. GAW, A TIME TO HEAL: THE DIFFUSION OF LISTERISM IN VICTORIAN BRITAIN 20 
(1999). 
 47.  Id. at 8 
 48.  Id. at 8–9.  
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interpretations of federal power over health that early Congresses embraced 
decentered the institutional structures that might otherwise have developed 
alongside the growth of the healthcare system through the twentieth century. 
Congress deferred assiduously to the states even where, as in the case of 
communicable diseases, the interstate dimensions of a problem would have 
permitted Congress to address it, declining to develop any systemic national 
public health regulation during the nineteenth century. This stunted the 
development of national public health institutions that, in recent periods, might 
have taken a more active institutional voice in promulgating and disseminating 
optimal standards of care and otherwise might have acted to counter the 
decentralizing trends in American medicine. Moreover, this normative pressure 
on Congress to avoid incursions on state authority over medicine became 
calicified over this long course of development such that congressional practice 
through the twentieth century continued to enshrine the diffuse authority 
structures of medical regulation even long after doctrinal constitutional limits 
on federal power had eroded. What was originally perceived as a doctrinal 
imperative became converted into a powerful rhetorical trope that channeled 
behavior within Congress and without—the practice of medicine was to be 
regulated primarily, and exclusively, by the states. 
The twentieth century would see a continuation of this long pattern even 
when Congress did enact statutes funding or regulating in the healthcare field. 
The result, which reverberates today, is a set of major federal health statutes 
intentionally filled with jurisdictional holes that disable federal institutions from 
meaningfully controlling therapeutic decisions even where such intervention 
might further safety or cost-control goals. This allocation was originally an 
imperative of perceived constitutional limits, but now persists due to a 
combination of regulatory path dependence and congressional deference to 
states over the proper locus of authority over medical care. Major federal 
statutory interventions like the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act in 193849 
and Medicare and Medicaid in 196550 expressly disclaimed federal authority 
over the actual practice of medicine (perceived to be within the states’ sphere of 
regulation) even while expanding the federal role in crucial ways over the safety 
and security of the medical system. For instance, Congress disclaimed any intent 
to regulate medical practice despite becoming a major funder of new hospitals 
in the Hill–Burton Act in the 1940s, which provided that “nothing in this title 
shall be construed as conferring on any Federal officer or employee the right to 
exercise any supervision or control over the administration, personnel, 
maintenance, or operation of any hospital with respect to which any funds have 
been or may be expended under this title.”51 Likewise, the Medicare statute 
 
 49.  Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 
U.S.C.). 
 50.  Both were created by the Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 51.  See Hospital Survey and Construction Act, Pub. L. No. 79-725, § 2, 60 Stat. 1040, 1049 (1946). 
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commits the federal government as the guarantor of medical access for older 
Americans and others, but nonetheless states that “[n]othing in this title shall be 
construed to authorize any Federal officer or employee to exercise any 
supervision or control over the practice of medicine or the manner in which 
medical services are provided.”52 
In repeatedly adopting a more parsimonious view of federal power over 
health issues than it might have exercised within the bounds of judicial 
constitutional doctrine, Congress has for the past two centuries engaged in a 
kind of legislative constitutionalism that has occurred in the context of other 
lawmaking episodes. But in this area of health policy the institutional valence 
regarding federal authority was inverted: Congress clung to a more narrowly 
crabbed sense of federal power than the Supreme Court or the Executive 
Branch. The result for healthcare has been a statutory “constitution” of 
negation, devolution, and underenforced authority at the federal level. To be 
clear, this long history evinces a recognizable strand of legislative 
constitutionalism, but to say that much does not mean that such patterns of 
congressional behavior are or ought to be imbued with controlling weight when 
raised in judicial constitutional litigation. Recognition that Congress has tended 
to overenforce federalism concerns in its own consideration of healthcare 
legislation ought not to compel similar judicial overenforcement in this area. 
What is more, even as Congress has authorized the federal government to 
take a gradually larger role in the financing and regulation of healthcare 
delivery, its statutory architecture has consistently preserved a major role for 
state discretion in implementing federal programs. The ACA itself embodies 
this dynamic of cooperative federalism. In the past half century, as the national 
government has become more involved in funding healthcare, Congress has 
often enlisted states as front-line administrators, with vast discretion over policy 
variation of programs such as Medicaid and SCHIP, which cover tens of 
millions of Americans. The existing Medicaid statute permits states to select 
dramatically different levels of funding and coverage, alter and experiment with 
different financing and delivery modes, and opt to cover (or not to cover) a 
range of particular procedures and therapies.53 States have leveraged this policy 
discretion to generate a myriad of dramatically different Medicaid programs 
over the past several decades.54 
The increasing state role in health governance has been fostered and 
encouraged not only by Congress in its basic statutory enactments but at least as 
 
 52.  Health Insurance for the Aged Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 102(a), 79 Stat. 290, 291 (1965). 
 53. See Jonathan R. Bolton, The Case of the Disappearing Statute: A Legal and Policy Critique of 
the Use of Section 1115 Waivers to Restructure the Medicaid Program, 37 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 
91, 96–97 (2003) (describing the “great flexibility” Medicaid’s statutory scheme grants to states). 
 54. See, e.g., John Holohan, State Variation in Medicaid Spending: Hard to Justify, 26 HEALTH 
AFFAIRS 667, 667 (2007) (noting variance in 2004 state spending per Medicaid enrollee ranging from 
$10,199 in New Jersey to $3,664 in California); John Holohan and David Liska, VARIATIONS IN 
MEDICAID SPENDING AMONG STATES (The Urban Institute 1997) (mapping variations of both 
spending and treatments offered between states). 
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much by Presidents of both parties through increasingly lenient uniformity 
enforcement by the federal administrative bureaucracy. The past twenty years, 
particularly under Presidents Clinton and Bush, saw an explosion in the number 
of Medicaid and SCHIP demonstration waivers granted by the federal 
government to the states. Federal administrative philosophy under both 
Presidents appears to have been to permit substantial variation and 
experimentation by state policymakers in administering joint programs. 
Unsurprisingly, the pervasiveness of this model of shared federalism in the 
healthcare area is particularly manifested in the fact that state government size 
and policy relevance has increased substantially faster than federal government 
over the past fifty years. In the aftermath of the major health program 
expansions such as Medicaid and Medicare, state government employees play 
an increasingly important role in the line-level implementation of national 
public policy. There are today about as many federal government employees as 
there were fifty years ago—roughly 2.5 million.55 Over the same period, the 
number of state and local public employees has expanded dramatically: from 
about 3 million in 1943 to about 16 million today. Put differently, the proportion 
of public employees who work for the national government as opposed to 
subsidiary governments has declined from thirty-seven percent in 1953 to about 
fifteen percent today. Budget numbers indicate an increasing number of these 
state employees are working on health matters: By 2003, close to one-half of all 
federal grant money to state and local governments involved health initiatives 
as their subject matter.56 There may well be valid concerns about a “government 
takeover” of healthcare, but in today’s regulatory climate of shared state–
federal government responsibility, which the ACA’s provisions embody, talk of 
a Washington takeover is clearly misguided. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
The ACA builds on this framework of cooperative federalism, and its 
architecture mimics Medicaid and other enactments in putting states on the 
front lines of policy formulation and enforcement. Parts of the ACA provide 
significantly more federal funding for Medicaid by pouring federal money into 
the existing state regimes that currently implement that program. Other 
sections of the ACA direct each state to set up a new health insurance exchange 
through which individuals and small businesses can purchase regulated 
insurance. The Act leaves open or ambiguous many policy choices regarding 
the structure and functioning of the exchanges and their regulatory posture 
toward private insurers. And whatever state policy discretion is built into the 
Act’s statutory language has been stretched further by the Obama 
 
 55.  Thomas Gais & James Fossett, Federalism and the Executive Branch, in INSTITUTIONS OF 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 503, Table 2 (Joel Aberbach & Mark Peterson 
eds., 2005). 
 56.  See id. at 499.  
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Administration in its rulemaking behavior: in July 2011 HHS issued lengthy 
regulations on the state health insurance exchanges that permit “maximum 
flexibility” to the states in establishing and operating these new regulatory 
entities.57 Contrary to much of the rhetoric surrounding the Commerce Clause 
litigation before the Supreme Court, state authority remains vital even in the 
new world of the ACA. 
In light of all of this, the true federalism issues involving the ACA are those 
in this realm of cooperative and overlapping federalism, not those of absolute 
limitation as articulated by opponents in the Commerce Clause litigation. 
Recurring federalism issues, with real consequences for patients’ rights, will 
play out after the litigation dust settles and states start establishing and 
implementing very different visions of insurance regulation under the ACA’s 
exchange provisions. The ACA does create profound federalism questions, 
including risks of state and individual coercion, but the most important 
institutional contestation will take place on fault lines much more complex than 
those of formal Commerce Clause doctrine. 
 
 
 57.  See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Establishment of Exchanges and Qualified 
Health Plans, 76 Fed. Reg. 41866 (proposed July 15, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 155 and 156). 
